2026 preview: Indo-Pacific summit diplomacy
U.S. policymakers will face distinct challenges and opportunities
By Yohannes Abraham
International summit diplomacy will present no shortage of complicated and consequential storylines in 2026. France—never shy under President Macron about asserting its foreign policy priorities—will hold the G7 presidency, while Turkey will host the NATO Summit. The United States will hold the G20 presidency and has already taken the unprecedented step of signaling that a founding G20 member, South Africa, is not welcome at the Miami summit. The 2026 Summit of the Americas, hosted by the Dominican Republic, will take place against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s Venezuela and immigration policies. Next year’s African Union summit, chaired by Angola, will need to continue grappling with multiple security and humanitarian crises across the continent, including the heartbreaking conflict in Sudan. Beyond these and other global and regional summits, two leader-level gatherings in the Indo-Pacific will present distinct challenges and opportunities for U.S. policymakers.
The Philippines, a treaty ally of the United States, will serve as the 2026 chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN’s approach to the region is rooted in a commitment to its “centrality”—a concept subject to some debate and interpretation, but that is at its core the idea that ASEAN should set the region’s diplomatic and economic agenda, rather than have it be dictated by larger neighbors. Diverse across nearly every dimension, ASEAN members’ strategic priorities are difficult to characterize collectively, save for a generally shared desire to maximize their diplomatic and economic freedom of movement and safeguard their sovereignty.
Manila’s assumption of the ASEAN chairmanship has real substantive impact. While maintaining a commitment to consensus decision-making, ASEAN member states tend to grant the chair meaningful latitude to propose and articulate the group’s annual priorities and to set the organization’s agenda. In the face of repeated and dangerous provocations by the People’s Republic of China vessels against Philippine personnel and assets—in defiance of both Philippine sovereignty and the principle of freedom of navigation—it is unsurprising that the Philippines has signaled that maritime security will be a core component of its chair-year agenda. Even the Philippines’ slogan, “Navigating Our Future, Together,” and chair-year logo—a traditional Philippine boat riding a wave—underscore this intent.
Notably, Manila will not only set the agenda for ASEAN itself, but also for the East Asia Summit (EAS), an ASEAN-led mechanism that brings ASEAN together with its most significant partners for dialogue at various levels, including an annual leaders summit. At its 2005 inception, the EAS included ASEAN plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea; the United States and Russia joined in 2011. This means the Philippines will shape the agenda for a year of discussions and negotiations at a table where both the PRC and the United States are present.
The second major Indo-Pacific leaders summit is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which will be hosted by the PRC in 2026. Founded in 1989 at the ministerial level, APEC is a forum of regional economies. While the forum is focused on economic cooperation, geopolitical issues rather self-evidently infuse its proceedings, particularly since its elevation to a leader-led forum in 1993. The PRC has announced its theme as “Building an Asia-Pacific Community to Prosper Together,” along with priorities of openness, innovation, and cooperation—seemingly benign terms that belie Beijing’s capacity and intent to leverage the forum for its diplomatic, economic, and ultimately strategic benefit, often at the expense of U.S. interests. The participation of Taiwan, a member of APEC (under the name, “Chinese Taipei”), will be closely watched by the U.S. government and others. The State Department recently reiterated that Washington “insists on the full and equal participation of all APEC member economies – including Taiwan, referred to as Chinese Taipei in APEC – consistent with APEC’s guidelines, rules and established practice, as affirmed by China in its offer to host in 2026.”
U.S. attendance at both forums will be closely scrutinized. The Trump administration has signaled some intent for President Trump to visit the PRC in 2026. Displays of convening power remain a significant source of prestige in the region, as seen at the most recent ASEAN Summit. Given the U.S.–Philippines treaty alliance and alignment on critical strategic interests, expectations in Manila for senior-level U.S. attendance will no doubt be high—particularly if a leader-level visit to the PRC materializes, and especially if that visit occurs in the context of a regional summit. How the U.S. approaches summits hosted by its only treaty ally in ASEAN will be closely watched and compared with other summits in 2026–not just in Manila, or even in Southeast Asia, but more broadly.
The Philippines will have an opportunity to place maritime security—including freedom of navigation and overflight, territorial integrity, and sovereignty—at the center of the regional agenda. While they bear the burden of the most aggressive PRC behavior, they are not alone in ASEAN in their concerns with the PRC’s maritime conduct and intent; indeed, nearly half of the 11-member grouping has some sort of maritime dispute with the PRC. In the EAS context, Manila will need the support of like-minded partners to maximize the diplomatic utility of its chairmanship. To this end, the United States can play a constructive role within EAS mechanisms and more broadly, supporting our ally in our shared strategic interests. In APEC, by contrast, the United States will need to balance active engagement in advancing and defending its interests with the fundamental asymmetry inherent in a forum hosted by the PRC—particularly given the growing salience of economic policy in the global strategic picture.
Ambassador Yohannes Abraham served as the U.S. ambassador to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from 2022-2024. He is the Miller Center’s Compton Visiting Professor in World Politics.